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Abstract
Improving the conceptualisation and measurement of women’s empowerment has been 
repeatedly identified as a research priority for global development policy. We apply argu-
ments from feminist and political philosophy to develop a unified typology of empower-
ment concepts to guide measurement and evaluation. In this typology, empowerment (1) 
may be a property of individuals or collectives (2) may involve removing internal psy-
chological barriers or external interpersonal barriers (3) may be defined on each agent’s 
own terms or by external agents in advance (4) may require agents to acquire a degree of 
independence or require others to ‘empower’ them through social support (5) may either 
concern the number of present options or the motivations behind past choices. We argue 
a careful examination of arguments for and against each notion of empowerment reveal 
fundamental fact-, theory- and value-based incompatibilities between contrasting notions. 
Thus, empowerment is an essentially contested concept that cannot be captured by simply 
averaging a large number of contrasting measures. We argue that researchers and practi-
tioners measuring this concept may benefit from making explicit their theory-, fact- and 
value-based assumptions about women’s empowerment before settling on a single primary 
measure for their particularly context. Alternative indicators can subsequently be used as 
sensitivity measures that not only measure sensitivity to assumptions about women’s social 
reality, but also to investigators’ own values.
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1 Introduction
Women’s empowerment is widely recognized as a global policy objective (UN General 
Assembly 2015) and a key component of strategies to promote health and combat pov-
erty world-wide (World Bank 2012; Every Women Every Child 2017). However, develop-
ment researchers have repeatedly encountered difficulties in constructing indicators for its 
measurement (Kabeer 1999; Richardson 2018; Malhotra and Schuler 2005; Raj 2017) and 
have commonly identified improving the conceptualisation and measurement of empower-
ment as a research priority (Ibrahim and Alkire 2007; Cunningham et  al. 2014; Carlson 
et al. 2015).
In this article, we draw on feminist and political philosophy to clarify debates over 
the meaning of women’s empowerment and generate a typology for its plural interpreta-
tions. We argue for a series of fact-, theory- and value-based judgments inherent in most 
measures of empowerment that create fundamental incompatibilities between contrasting 
notions of empowerment. Thus, we argue researchers and practitioners might benefit from 
selecting a single notion of empowerment as their primary measure in empirical applica-
tions and treating other measures as secondary measures testing sensitivity to their own 
assumptions.
2  The Need for a Typology
Existing development discourse has often debated appropriate methods for the measure-
ment of ‘true’ empowerment (Richardson 2018; Cueva Beteta 2006; Klasen and Schüler 
2011). A recent review identified three obstacles to improving measures of empowerment 
(Richardson 2018): (1) Poor integration of theory into the development of indicators (2) 
Implicit judgment and bias in methods of analysing data (3) Narrow choice of indicators 
that fails to capture the full scope of the empowerment concept. All of these tasks require 
researchers to first establish what they mean by ‘women’s empowerment’.
This likely requires judgments of both value and fact—empowerment is a ‘thick ethical 
concept’ (Williams 1985) that lies in the middle of a continuum between purely value-
laden and purely factual concepts (Putnam 2002). For example, when the Fifth Sustainable 
Development Goal aims to ‘achieve gender equality and empower all women and girls’ 
(UN General Assembly 2015) or when empowerment is labelled ‘intrinsically valuable’ 
(Trommlerová et al. 2015), then researchers and policy-makers are directly appealing to its 
normative aspects. Yet the Fifth Sustainable Development Goal also refers to a factual state 
of the world that the global community hopes to achieve by 2030. More generally, thick 
ethical concepts usually involve an inextricable entanglement of facts, values and theories 
(Putnam and Walsh 2007).
Value-based disagreements are notoriously difficult to settle (Railton 1986). Political 
philosophers have argued that power and freedom are ‘essentially contested’ (Lukes 2005; 
Gallie 1956) or ‘irreducibly plural’ (Alkire 2005a) concepts for which widespread agree-
ment exists concerning their practical importance in the real world, while disagreement 
abounds concerning their proper interpretation. These disagreements stem from entirely 
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reasonable fundamental differences in philosophical standpoints rather than simply differ-
ences in linguistic convention, lack of logical clarity, or lack of empirical evidence.1
For example, suppose a newly married Nepalese couple wants to have a child. The 
young wife would like to finish her university education and get a job but also worries 
about spending sufficient time with her child as a professional woman. The husband pro-
poses to his wife that she forego her education and stay at home to raise the child. We 
could class his proposal as either empowering or disempowering depending on our fact-, 
value- and theory-based assumptions. We could class it as disempowering and paternalistic 
by exposing the woman to risk by leaving her future access to material well-being in her 
husband’s control. We could class it as caring and empowering, because it unburdens her 
from having to juggle childcare and further study in a resource-constrained context.
We present this example, not to argue for a single interpretation of empowerment, but 
to illustrate a situation where we cannot decide on a measure of empowerment without 
making value-laden choices. Stating that the woman’s situation contains both aspects of 
empowerment and disempowerment does little to clarify how we should assess her, since 
most social situations can be classified as either empowering or disempowering depending 
on one’s values and assumptions. Neither can we create an aggregate index of both con-
cepts, since their respective arguments directly contradict one another. Rather, we need to 
make a choice.
Feminist and political philosophers have uncovered many such situations, which we will 
describe. Nevertheless, development researchers have often aggregated a large number of 
divergent empowerment concepts into a single index without fully considering whether the 
arguments for each component measure are logically compatible (Alkire et al. 2013; Ibra-
him and Alkire 2007). Thus, we believe there is a need for an accessible framework that 
organises contrasting conceptualisations of empowerment and highlights situations where 
these contrasts cannot be aggregated.2
3  A Typology of Concepts
Figure 1 shows an overall framework for defining empowerment, adapted from a seminal 
formula by Gerald MacCallum (1967):
Whenever the freedom of some agent or agents is in question, it is always freedom 
from some constraint of, restriction on, interference with, or barrier to doing, not 
doing, becoming, or not becoming something … agent x is (is not) free from y to do 
(not do, become, not become) z (p. 314).
An empowered agent x possesses the ability to reach an outcome z when faced with a bar-
rier y. Empowerment is the process through which an agent becomes empowered. When we 
measure an agent’s level of empowerment, we are measuring the extent to which this agent 
is empowered.
1 Some researchers argue such disagreements are even an intrinsic function of essentially contested con-
cepts, as they create productive and creative conversations about human values (Woolcock 2010).
2 Note that this article will primarily draw on political and feminist philosophy, as a conceptual review of 
empowerment in other fields such as community psychology—which also have a long history of engage-
ment with the empowerment concept—is outside the scope of this paper.
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This framework unifies many disparate conceptions of empowerment. By varying the 
values of x, y and z, we obtain distinct concepts of empowerment. Additional axes of 
variation are represented by variables v—the viewpoint from which we assess agent abil-
ities-and w—the relationship to external agents. v refers to the extent to which we con-
sider empowered agents to have many options available or to feel highly satisfied with the 
choices they have made. w refers to the extent to which empowered agents are free of oth-
ers’ interference or blessed with others’ support.
The contrasting aspects of each variable are summarised in Table 1. In the following 
sections, we discuss each distinction in detail and delineate the reasons (1) why the distinc-
tion matters (2) what it entails for measurement.
4  Type of Agent x: Individual or Collective
4.1  Why the Distinction Matters
The first judgment in MacCallum (1967)‘s formula concerns the choice of agent, x. While 
the term ‘women’s empowerment’ clearly signifies a focus on women (Richardson 2018), 
it is ambiguous whether it refers to the empowerment of individual women (x =‘an indi-
vidual woman’) or the empowerment of women collectively (x = ‘a collective of women’) 
as an interest group (Jónasdóttir 1988). This matters because collective empowerment has 
a highly contested relationship to individual empowerment.
4.1.1  Collective Empowerment May Increase in Individual Empowerment
Community psychologists have often seen individual empowerment as positively related to 
collective empowerment (Wallerstein and Bernstein 1994). If we conceptualise collective 











Fig. 1  Conceptual framework for empowerment: Agent x is empowered if they are able to overcome barrier 
y to achieving outcome z, possibly posed by external agent w. The viewpoint v concerns whether we are 
primarily concerned with future opportunities for achievement (forward-looking) or past motivations for 
enacted actions (backward-looking)
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and individual empowerment as the ability of groups and individuals to achieve collective 
and individual goals respectively, then collective empowerment arguably increases with 
individual empowerment, as long group and individual goals are aligned. For example, all-
female micro-credit groups have been observed to spontaneously mobilise to prevent vio-
lence against women in their community (Sanyal 2009). The ability of the whole group to 
prevent violence against women arguably increases in group members’ individual ability to 
support women facing violence.
4.1.2  Collective Empowerment May be Independent of Individual Empowerment
A positive relationship between individual and collective empowerment requires a con-
ception of individual empowerment that includes individual possession of interpersonal 
capabilities, since the ability of groups to achieve collective outcomes usually depends as 
much on the quality of member relations as on individual abilities. Group dynamics, social 
identity, and group leadership all play a major role in aggregating individual capabilities 
into collective power (Radke et al. 2016; Freeman 1972; Cohen and Bailey 1997). A major 
study of small group effectiveness involving 192 groups found empirical evidence for a 
collective intelligence factor, a ‘c factor’, which depended more on average social sensitiv-
ity of group members than individual intelligence (Woolley et al. 2010). Large groups face 
high transaction costs when coordinating action across geographical areas which prevent 
collective interests from translating into collective action (Heckathorn 1996). A 1983 Gal-
lup poll showed 40% of US residents believed there might be nuclear war by 1998 and 70% 
believed they would not survive it, but only a very small minority engaged in collective 
protest (Hornsey et al. 2006).
Even so, individual capability is not guaranteed to aggregate straightforwardly into col-
lective capability. Social capital researchers have frequently commented on the need to dis-
tinguish between social capital as an individual benefit through social connections, or a 
collective resource that benefits communities or societies (Poortinga 2006; Portes 2000; 
Kawachi et al. 2004). Even if many women individually report high degrees of social sup-
port, this does not necessarily entail women collectively are empowered, if these women 
all draw on social support from the same person.
Similarly, Cohen (1983) noted how widespread individual capability may be compat-
ible with a complete lack of collective capability: A policy that reserves 1% of civil servant 
jobs for local women might empower women individually, since they all have an individual 
opportunity to be part of the select 1%, but their collective capability to enter government 
service has not altered noticeably. Tokenistic offers of elite status to a small number of 
oppressed people may even be used to discourage protest and maintain hierarchical power 
structures (Wright and Taylor 1999).
In all the above cases, collective empowerment may be largely independent of individ-
ual empowerment.
4.1.3  Collective Empowerment May Decrease in Individual Empowerment
When individual and collective goals are not aligned, then collective empowerment may 
even be opposed to individual empowerment. A common theme in social anthropology 
(Rao 2005), team psychology (Barker 1993), and sociology (Bauman 2013) is the tendency 
for groups to empower themselves to achieve collective goals by restricting the power of 
their members. For example, Rao (2005) observed how the Indonesian ideology of svadaya 
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gotong royong promoted community capacity by requiring members to contribute to col-
lective projects lest they be labelled ‘unpatriotic’ and subject to social sanctions by fellow 
members. All-female, joint liability microcredit groups have been lauded for their ability 
to achieve high levels of loan repayment through the use of shame, sanction and pressure 
to conform (Banerjee 2013). Yet researchers have commented on their potential to gener-
ate excessive peer pressure through verbal harassment, public shaming and confiscation of 
assets leading to reported incidents of stress and even suicide in over-indebted borrowers 
(Rahman 1999; Ahmed et al. 2001). The paradoxical ability of collective empowerment to 
restrict individual freedom has been polemically labelled ‘The Tyranny of Participation’ 
(Cooke and Kothari 2001).
4.2  What this Means for Measurement
When collective empowerment is independent of or opposed to individual empowerment, 
we cannot obtain valid measures of collective empowerment from measures of individual 
empowerment. When collective capacity derives its power from social control of individu-
als, we cannot easily combine collective and individual empowerment into an aggregate 
index.
5  Type of Barrier y: Internal or External
5.1  Why the Distinction Matters
Berlin (1959) introduced a well-known distinction between ‘positive’ and ‘negative’ 
freedom, where the ‘positive’ notion referred to a form of self-realisation—people act-
ing according to their authentic principles and avoiding the temptations of their irrational 
impulses—and the ‘negative’ notion referred to a condition of being free from interference, 
coercion or restraint from other people. MacCallum (1967) categorised Berlin’s distinc-
tion in terms of the choice of barrier y. In positive freedom, agent x attempted to overcome 
internal, mental barriers. In negative freedom, the barriers were external and interpersonal. 
Over time, political and feminist philosophers have raised numerous arguments for and 
against either concept.
5.1.1  Internal Notions of Empowerment May be Appropriated for Freedom‑Limiting 
Purposes
Berlin (1959) was strongly critical of internal notions of freedom, arguing they were open 
to abuse by totalitarian states who could restrain citizens’ liberties by claiming they were 
freeing them from their lower impulses. He argued a prisoner in an isolation cell could be 
considered free by such definitions, if their actions continued to accord with their guiding 
values. For example, studies have shown that judgments of the authenticity of conflicting 
desires are often conveniently made to fit viewers’ own political values. When American 
undergraduate students were presented with a hypothetical case of a devout Christian who 
felt repressed homosexual impulses, conservative participants located his ‘true self’ in his 
Christian principles, while liberal participants located it in his homosexual impulses (New-
man et al. 2013).
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5.1.2  Internal Notions of Empowerment Reflect Ability to Cope with Oppression 
Rather than Lack of Oppression Itself
Feminist psychologist Riger (1993) castigated internal notions for promoting ‘the sense of 
empowerment’ (p. 281) over actual power, making the political personal, and supporting 
the status quo. Watts and Hipolito-Delgato (2015) rhetorically asked about the feasibil-
ity of ‘thinking ourselves to liberation’. Kitzinger (1991) argued internal notions of power 
blamed victims of rape and other forms of abuse for their victimhood, reinforced the struc-
tural drivers of gender inequality, and assumed an ‘individualist myth’ of the ‘free, auton-
omous, self-fulfilled and authentic woman’ (p. 124). Berlin (1959) similarly felt internal 
notions of freedom reflected an individual’s ability to cope with oppression rather than an 
objective lack of oppression itself. By appropriately reducing individual aspirations, any 
individual could claim to attain complete internal freedom. He called this the ‘doctrine 
of sour grapes’ based on an Aesop fable wherein a fox, unable to reach a set of grapes, 
exclaimed that these were sour anyway.
5.1.3  External Notions of Empowerment Ignore Issues of False Consciousness
Taylor (1979) sharply criticised external notions of freedom for ignoring internal, men-
tal obstacles, arguing the very idea of states protecting individual freedom depended on a 
community that valued such freedoms. Following a long tradition of thinkers from Marx 
to Lukes, he argued that action guided by ‘fear, inauthentically internalised standards, 
or false consciousness’ (p. 215) should be considered cases of unfreedom, because indi-
viduals often underwent socialisation processes that made them accept oppressive norms 
and values as natural and inevitable features of reality (Lukes 2005; Freire 1972; Femia 
1987; Eyerman 1981). Insufficient critical awareness thus became a key barrier to engage 
in action to change one’s circumstances (Taylor 1985). For example, Busby’s (1999) eth-
nography of a South Indian fishing village revealed how local women often saw domestic 
violence as a simple ‘force of nature’ that emerged when men lost their temper. This ren-
dered men’s active role in perpetrating domestic violence invisible and made it difficult for 
women to imagine situations where such violence did not happen.
5.1.4  External Notions of Empowerment Ignore Second‑Order Desires
Dworkin (1988) pointed out that individuals have both first-order desires for substantive 
achievements and second-order desires, which are desires about desires. For example, a 
married woman with conflicting feelings about her abusive husband might have a first-
order desire to please her husband and a second-order desire to stop being a pleaser. In 
Dworkin’s (1988) conception of autonomy, individual capacities for emotional and behav-
ioural self-control were central to freedom. Such capacities cannot be captured using exter-
nal notions of empowerment.
5.1.5  External Notions of Empowerment Reflect Masculinist Bias
Feminist philosophers argue certain external conceptions of power are based on notions 
of interpersonal dominance, or ‘power-over’ other people (Wartenberg 1992). Such 
notions may embody implicitly hierarchical, masculinist values of domination and control 
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(Wartenberg 1992). Their realisation may also merely alter the identity of people who hold 
power leaving the underlying structures of hierarchy and inequality intact (Irigaray 1985). 
Feminist philosophers have instead advocated for conceptions of power as an inner men-
tal or spiritual strength (Starhawk 1987) allowing agents to overcome self-hatred, inferi-
ority complexes, or internalised homophobia and sexism (Rowlands 1997; Calvès 2009; 
Kitzinger 1991). This alternative, internal notion of empowerment is called ‘power-from-
within’ (Starhawk 1987).
5.2  What this Means for Measurement
When any of the aforementioned arguments are believed to have merit, it is hard to argue 
for using an internal measure of empowerment to proxy for external empowerment or vice 
versa.3 Indeed, many arguments in favour of internal empowerment vigorously oppose 
external empowerment and vice versa. This makes it difficult to create aggregate indices of 
internal and external notions. For example, the concern that internal notions of empower-
ment measures ability to cope with oppression rather than alleviation of oppression itself 
hardly diminishes if we take a weighted average of internal and external measures. The 
potential for external notions of empowerment to perpetuate values of dominance and 
hierarchy does not diminish if researchers simply complement an external measure with 
an internal measure. If we theorise individual selves as having second-order desires, then 
external notions of freedom may be tangentially related to empowerment.
6  Type of Viewpoint v: Forward‑ or Backward‑Looking Freedom
6.1  Why the Distinction Matters
Taylor (1979) distinguished between ‘exercise freedom’, where the deciding factor was 
whether individual actions were motivated by their own or other people’s values and 
goals, and ‘opportunity freedom’, which was determined by the number of options avail-
able to a person. Other names for this distinction include ‘episodic power’ versus ‘dispo-
sitional power’ (Cobb 1984); ‘enacted’ versus ‘potential’ power (Provan 1980); ‘process’ 
versus ‘opportunity freedoms’ (Sen 1993). We call this variable ‘viewpoint’ and distin-
guish between ‘forward-looking freedoms’ that look ahead to see what opportunities lie 
in the future and ‘backward-looking freedoms’ that assess agents’ motivation behind past 
actions. Another formulation of backward-looking freedoms was offered by Drydyk (2013) 
who asserted that ‘agency’ really indicated the extent to which a person’s activities were 
‘owned’ by themselves and ‘alienated’ from themselves.
3 Analogously to the individual case, we can classify notions of collective empowerment into internal or 
external concepts. Internal notions of collective empowerment would focus on enhancing the capacity of 
collectives through improved internal organisation (e.g. making members of the collective more co-oper-
ative towards one another). External notions would focus on ensuring freedom from interference by out-
side parties, as in the concept of ‘sovereignty’ (Sarooshi 2003), or establishing equitable partnerships with 
external agents, such as the State. All the previous arguments for and against internal or external barriers to 
individual empowerment can be applied to collective empowerment with minor modifications.
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6.1.1  Too Much Choice can Demotivate Decision‑Making
It may seem counterintuitive that forward- and backward-looking notions can conflict 
with one another, as increased choice ought to facilitate satisfaction of individual pref-
erences. However, this is not necessarily the case in practice; situations with ‘too much 
choice’ may demotivate individuals, paralyse decision-making and make people more 
prone to regret their choice, whatever they finally choose (Iyengar and Lepper 2000). 
Increased availability of opportunity may also increase individual aspiration (Beaman 
et  al. 2012; Genicot and Ray 2017), potentially leaving individuals no more satisfied 
with their choices than before their opportunities expanded.
6.1.2  Forward‑Looking Freedoms Do Not Entail Exercise of Freedom
Forward-looking notions of freedom are criticised for considering individuals to be free 
regardless of whether they actually exercise their freedoms (Taylor 1979). Political theorists 
have argued that freedom is a habit that individuals need to inculcate through repeated partic-
ipation in decision-making (Gerber et al. 2003). Other philosophers have asserted that mod-
ern states subtly limit individual freedom by providing legal opportunities for political power 
while simultaneously socialising citizens to stay disengaged (Rose 1999). Feminist theorists 
have often highlighted the fact that Muslim women in South Asia are legally entitled to a 
share in parental land under Islamic law, but usually refrain from exercising these rights for 
fear of losing social support from their family members (Kabeer 1999; Agarwal 1994).
6.1.3  Backward‑Looking Freedoms Do Not Entail Availability of Opportunity
Backward-looking freedoms are criticised for considering individuals free, even if they 
only have one option to choose from, as long as this option happens to align with their val-
ues and goals (Bavetta 2004). This is potentially dangerous, since a major value of free-
dom rests in its ability to guarantee flexibility in the face of unexpected outcomes (Carter 
1995). Even if a person is fully satisfied with their present life, they may not be able to 
accurately forecast future life satisfaction. Without the opportunity to conduct ‘experi-
ments in living’ (Carter 1995) whereby they get to experience the outcomes of their own 
choices, they may find themselves unable to escape a life trajectory they no longer value.
6.2  What this Means for Measurement
In situations where women’s forward-looking freedoms are potentially opposed to their 
backward-looking freedoms, we cannot assume that one measure of empowerment acts as 
a good proxy for the other measure. In such situations, it also becomes difficult to defend 
an aggregate index of both measures. For example, if a medically trained woman gives 
up a career as a doctor because her husband forbids her to work, she may report that her 
opportunities for employment reduced to zero, but she is satisfied with being unemployed, 
as she genuinely wants to please her husband. If we believe that the opportunity to conduct 
‘experiments in living’ is critical to empowerment, we cannot simply consider her ‘half 
empowered’, since the opportunity to even try living as a doctor has been denied her.
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7  Relationship to External Agent w: Direct or Indirect Freedom
7.1  Why the Distinction Matters
This axis of variation only applies to concepts of empowerment where the barrier involves 
an external agent. A recurring debate in the theory of empowerment is whether empower-
ment should be defined in terms of ‘direct’ or ‘indirect’ freedom (Iversen 2003; Sen 2005; 
Alkire 2008). Direct freedom refers to direct involvement in realising one’s own goals, 
while indirect freedom allows for third-party intermediaries to help realise one’s goals and 
values, possibly without one’s full awareness. This distinction has also been referred to 
as the difference between ‘effective power’ and ‘choice-mediated control’ (Iversen 2003), 
‘effective power’ and ‘procedural control’ (Sen 1985), ‘personal control’ and ‘proxy con-
trol’ (Bandura 1997), or ‘policy control’ and ‘implementation control’ (Kabeer 1997).
7.1.1  Indirect Freedom May Encourage Dependency on External Agents
Opponents of indirect freedom tend to advocate for greater independence in external 
relationships (Kitzinger 1991) to protect agents from perceived risks of exploitation and 
conflict (Kabeer 2001). For example, Iversen (2003) argued that indirect freedom was 
disempowering and paternalistic, because it deprived agents of opportunities to cultivate 
self-reliance and decision-making skills. Such agents became dependent on others to real-
ise their own goals and needed to continually ingratiate themselves with their supporters 
to extract desired favours. Iversen argued such notions of empowerment could be used 
to legitimise the status quo where a male patriarchal household head ‘supported’ female 
household members by ruling over them.
7.1.2  Direct Freedom Expects Too Much from Self‑Reliance
Supporters of indirect freedom tend to recast dependency as social support and view direct 
freedom as disempowering, because it burdens agents with the responsibility of realising 
goals and values without assistance from others. Sen (1985) argued that indirect freedom 
necessarily formed part of people’s experience of freedom, since the interdependent nature 
of society made it impossible for any single person to be fully self-reliant. For example, 
Kabeer (1997) noted how urban Bangladeshi women did not experience leaving violently 
abusive husbands as empowering, because they felt socially isolated and vulnerable to har-
assment and assault by men in public.
7.1.3  Direct Freedom Reflects Masculinist Bias
Feminist theorists criticised concepts of empowerment based on individualism and ‘a pref-
erence for traditionally masculine concepts of mastery, power, and control over tradition-
ally feminine concerns of communion and cooperation’ (p. 279) (Riger 1993) and called 
for alternatives to an obsession with autonomy and independence to the point of ‘autonomy 
fetishism’ (Khader 2015). Riger (1993) argued that traditional notions of power had mar-
ginalised behaviour belonging to the communal, expressive, ‘feeling’ realm and had led 
feminists to punish women for making relationships and connections central to their lives.
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7.1.4  Indirect Freedom May Marginalise Women’s Voices
Kitzinger (1991) argued that critiques of ‘power-over’ as a masculinist concept reinforced 
women’s oppression by perpetuating the myth that the two sexes held separate spheres of 
competence, which had been invoked by philosophers ‘from Aristotle through Rousseau 
to Freud’ to argue for ‘women’s different and (implicitly and explicitly) inferior under-
standings of political issues like justice, ethics and power’ (p. 115). Other feminists cau-
tioned that intransigent conflicts of interests across societal divides are not easily be solved 
through a naïve emphasis on harmony (Guijt and Shah 1998) and that invocations of ‘com-
munity’, ‘family harmony’ and the pressures of male ‘breadwinners’ carry their own risk of 
silencing marginalized voices and hiding power differentials within households (Guijt and 
Shah 1998; Batliwala 2007; Folbre and Nelson 2000).
7.2  What this Means for Measurement
Arguments for direct freedom often vigorously oppose indirect freedom and vice versa. If 
we genuinely believe that indirect freedom promotes dependency in unequal power rela-
tions and marginalises women’s voices, then it does not make sense to consider an eco-
nomically dependent married woman ‘half-empowered’, because she receives money from 
her earning husband. Similarly, if we sincerely believe that direct freedom reflects a mascu-
linist bias with independence over communion and imposes burdens on women to escape 
oppression through self-help, then it does not make sense to consider an economically 
independent woman ‘half-empowered’, because she earns her own income. In such cases, 
measuring one as a proxy for the other or computing an average of the two measures does 
not seem advisable.
8  Type of Outcome z: Subjective or Objective Interests
8.1  Why the Distinction Matters
The final variable in MacCallum’s formula z denotes the outcome that an agent can 
achieve. The specification of z is important, since ‘some life choices have larger implica-
tions for women’s agency than others’ (Richardson 2018). For example, repairing potholes 
in the road can hardly be said to disempower local women, even if it restricts their ‘free-
dom’ to fall into one, because such achievements are not relevant (Taylor 1985).
An enduring debate over the choice of z concerns whether the promotion of individuals’ 
‘subjective interests’ or their ‘objective interests’ should be considered a form of empower-
ment (Jónasdóttir 1988). Theorists have been divided over whether every individual should 
determine the relevant outcome z according to their own unique standards (‘subjective 
interests’) or whether it is possible to discern at least some universally acceptable domains 
of life through careful reasoning by a group of experts (‘objective interests’) (Jónasdóttir 
1988).
For example, calls by Western human rights activists to take action against female gen-
ital mutilation in Sub-Saharan Africa have sometimes backfired and made local women 
more confident about asserting their own ‘cultural obligations’ (Althaus 1997) to con-
tinue the practice. In such situations, women’s ability to further their objective interest of 
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combating female genital mutilation has decreased, while their ability to further their sub-
jective interest of preserving tradition has arguably increased.
Proponents of subjective interests have argued that expert-driven agenda-setting ignores 
women’s perceptions of their own empowerment (1997) and comes with risks of paternal-
ism (Khader 2011). Proponents of objective interests have argued that respondent-driven 
agenda-setting ignores individual information constraints (Paasche-Orlow and Wolf 2007) 
and psychological biases (Thaler and Shefrin 1981). These arguments mirror the debate 
over internal versus external barriers to empowerment, thus we will not repeat them here.
Reliance on subjective interests can sometimes be used by researchers to resolve choices 
about the other variables x, y, v and w in our framework. For example, researchers could 
ask women themselves to choose whether they prefer direct or indirect freedom and score 
them accordingly. Indeed, Chirkov et al. (2003) argued autonomous individuals choose to 
be dependent on people who are perceived as supportive and independent of people per-
ceived as coercive. Pettit (1996, 1997) argued external interference only limits freedoms 
if it is perceived as illegitimate. Although this position may seem to help researchers avoid 
hard choices, it does require them to make a formidable commitment to women’s subjec-
tive interests.
Consider the case of female genital mutilation. Suppose woman A believes women 
should be forced to undergo the procedure to achieve the collective goal of preserving tra-
ditional culture, while woman B believes women should be individually free to make their 
own choice. An extreme subjectivist viewpoint would commit us to view both women as 
equally empowered if A was forced to undergo the procedure, while B chose not to do it, 
because both women had their wishes realised, even if those wishes were based on oppo-
site values.
8.2  What this Means for Measurement
Unless researchers have good knowledge of the preferences of their target population and 
have tailored their measurement of empowerment accordingly, it is likely that women’s 
objective interests, as determined by outside agents, will differ from their subjective inter-
ests. In such cases, it is unlikely that researchers can obtain accurate information about 
women’s ability to achieve their subjective interests from measures of empowerment in the 
objective realm and vice versa for objective interests. When subjective and objective meas-
ures of empowerment are opposed to one another, we can usually not take a simple average 
of the two.
9  Classification of Existing Indicators
Table  2 displays commonly used measures of women’s empowerment in international 
development along with a classification of their location in our typology. We have assessed 
each indicator based on what it directly measures rather than what it may proxy for or what 
it may measure in practice, once cultural, social and cognitive biases enter the picture.4
4 Space does not permit us to discuss more fully the many statistical and survey administration-related 
issues in measuring empowerment in practice. Such issues have been extensively covered in related litera-
ture (Richardson 2018; Lippman et al. 2016; Raudenbush and Sampson 1999; Alkire et al. 2013; Ewerling 
et al. 2017; Agarwala and Lynch 2006; Gram et al. 2017; Vaz et al. 2016).
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9.1  Decision‑Making Measures
The Demographic and Health Surveys (Kishor and Subaiya 2008) routinely ask married 
women of reproductive age ‘who in your family usually has the final say on’ a variety 
of domains from household purchases to visits to family and friends in countries around 
the world. The response options typically include the woman herself, the woman jointly 
with her husband, the woman jointly with other household members, her husband only, or 
other household members only. As observed by Kabeer (2001), some researchers consider 
women empowered only if they make decisions solely on their own (De Brauw et al. 2014), 
while others consider them empowered if they participate in decisions whether on their 
own or jointly with others (Singh et al. 2014).
For this measure, the agent in question is clearly a single individual rather than a col-
lective. The barriers to her empowerment are external household relations.5 Usually these 
questions are used to indicate empowerment for women without evidence that women 
themselves feel the domains being queried are important (Ahmed et al. 2010; Shroff et al. 
2009), which bespeaks a targeting of objective interests pre-determined by outside experts. 
The measure takes a forward-looking viewpoint, because it focuses on what decisions the 
respondent is able to influence, i.e. ‘have the final say on’, rather than what decisions the 
respondent tends to exercise in practice. For example, a mother-in-law who is utterly unin-
terested in supervising her daughter-in-law’s cooking activities will still be counted as 
empowered in the domain of food preparation if she has the authority to intervene, should 
she wish to do so. Finally, the measure places a strong emphasis on indirect freedom, since 
women do not need to directly involve themselves with executing decisions in order to 
count as empowered.
The target concept of this measure is quite sensitive to adjustments in the wording and 
scoring of survey questions. The measure could be altered to focus on overcoming inter-
nal, mental barriers, if it was reworded to ‘How confident do you feel that you can con-
trol your own spending?’ The emphasis on women’s objective interests could be moved 
towards subjective interests by using qualitative research to determine if the domains being 
asked were considered relevant to the respondents themselves (Schatz and Williams 2012), 
or by asking women in the survey itself whether they wanted to make decisions in the 
domain being queried (Ibrahim and Alkire 2007). The forward-looking viewpoint could be 
changed to a backward-looking viewpoint by asking ‘who decided on past household pur-
chases’. The focus on indirect freedom could be changed to an emphasis on direct freedom 
by asking ‘who usually executes household purchases’ and only scoring the respondent as 
empowered if she alone does this.
9.2  Self‑Efficacy
Bandura’s (2001) concept of self-efficacy is an oft-proposed (Alkire 2005b; Schuler et al. 
2010; Alkire 2008; Malhotra and Schuler 2005) and used (Upadhyay et al. 2014; Swen-
deman et  al. 2009) measure of women’s empowerment in international development. A 
5 Here, we assume the target concept of these questions is an objective level of decision-making power 
rather than merely respondents’ perceived level of power. This is usually their intended meaning, as 
researchers have extensively engaged in comparing of responses to such questions between different house-
hold members to assess the ‘true’ level of power in a relationship (Jejeebhoy 2002; Allendorf 2007; Godoy 
et al. 2006).
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typical question asks women about their perceived skill controlling a specific behaviour, 
such as condom use (Albarracín et al. 2004). Self-efficacy is itself one of many possible 
measures of ‘psychological empowerment’ (Zimmerman 1995; Johnson et  al. 2005) that 
focus on individual ability to regulate their emotions and control their own behaviour.
Bandura saw his measure of self-efficacy as measuring the ability of a single, inte-
gral self in overcoming mental barriers internal to itself (Bandura 1999). The barriers to 
empowerment are clearly internal, as individuals are considered empowered, when they 
feel empowered, regardless of the presence of external constraints on their behaviour. Indi-
viduals are not classed as empowered if their environment changes, unless they themselves 
perceive their environment to have changed. For example, a socially anxious woman who 
lacks confidence to attend university as a mature student, because she fears ridicule from 
other students is disempowered, even if no-one has any intention of actually ridiculing her. 
Measures of self-efficacy are typically forward-looking, since they ask respondents what 
they can do rather than what motivated them to do what they did in the past. The distinc-
tion between direct and indirect freedom is not applicable, as self-efficacy is an internal 
notion of empowerment.
Bandura emphasised that ‘generalised self-efficacy’ does not exist, because self-efficacy 
is a domain-specific construct, which only attains adequate predictive validity when one 
examines ‘microrelations at the level of particular activities’ (Bandura 1997); for example, 
a sports player’s perceived self-efficacy in winning a particular game against a particular 
opponent in a particular setting. Other researchers have argued for the validity of questions 
on generalised self-efficacy based on factor analyses of psychometric data (Judge et  al. 
2002; Scholz et al. 2002). Such questions would ask women to agree or disagree with ques-
tions such as ‘I can always manage to solve difficult problems if I try hard enough’ or ‘I can 
handle whatever comes my way’ (Scholz et al. 2002).
If researchers measure women’s empowerment using a domain-specific measure of self-
efficacy, e.g. exercise self-efficacy (Strecher et al. 1986), then they implicitly operate with 
a notion of objective interest, since they have decided in advance on an outcome for indi-
viduals to achieve. If researchers use a measure of generalised self-efficacy, then they work 
with a notion of subjective interest, since respondents are likely to imagine outcomes that 
they feel are important to themselves.
9.3  The Relative Autonomy Index
Ibrahim and Alkire (2007) proposed the use of the Relative Autonomy Index from Self-
Determination Theory (Deci and Ryan 2000) as part of a suite of internationally compara-
ble indicators on women’s empowerment. This index has been used in a range of evalua-
tions from the impact of participatory women’s groups on women’s empowerment (Gram 
et al. 2018a, b) to the impact of health clubs on the empowerment of tribal youth (Sarkar 
et al. 2017). It also forms part of the Women’s Empowerment in Agriculture Index (Alkire 
et al. 2013), which has been used in Bangladesh (Sraboni et al. 2014), Ghana (Malapit and 
Quisumbing 2015) and Nepal (Malapit et al. 2013, 2015).
The index contains a series of structured sections each starting with a framing question 
followed by questions about individual motivations to carry out or refrain from carrying 
out activities in a particular domain. For example, a woman might be asked if she performs 
work inside the house, outside the house or both followed by questions on whether she 
performs the type of work she has mentioned because she wants to, because it is person-
ally important, because she will get into trouble with others otherwise, or because she is 
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afraid of others’ ill-judgment. She is asked to agree or disagree with each statement on a 
four-point Likert scale and scored according to the extent to which her motivations reflect 
greater internal relative to external motivation (Gram et al. 2017; Vaz et al. 2016).
The tool clearly employs a backward-looking viewpoint, as it asks respondents about 
the motivations behind their actions rather than the range of potential future actions open 
to them. It includes both internal and external barriers to action. Items such as ‘I do this 
work because I will get punished otherwise’ measure external barriers, because the pres-
ence or absence of an external threat decides women’s level of empowerment (Deci and 
Ryan 2000). Items such as ‘I do this work because I want people to like me’ are meant 
to reflect an internal barrier, where fears of self-punishment through feelings of rejection 
and low self-esteem pressure the respondent to ignore their own authentic values and goals 
(Deci and Ryan 2000). In contexts where respondents’ well-being and survival depend cru-
cially on being liked by others, the implied motivation of agreeing with this item may be 
fear of external punishment rather than any form of self-punishment (Gram et al. 2017). In 
such a case, the index targets purely external barriers to empowerment.
The tool favours respondents’ own subjective interests over any notion of objective 
interest, since women are directly scored on whether they themselves consider their own 
activities valuable. If women are unable to participate in household decisions in a domain 
they will still be counted as empowered, if they appreciate being able to leave such deci-
sions to others. If women feel forced to participate in household decisions by other family 
members, they are counted as disempowered. Finally, the tool takes a subjectivist position 
that favours neither direct nor indirect freedom. If women choose to depend on others, then 
they score just as highly as if they chose to be independent. Women are disempowered if 
they are forced to be either independent or dependent on others against their will.
9.4  Women’s Collective Empowerment?
Many measures of women’s empowerment include a dimension on group participation or 
connectedness to social networks (Ibrahim and Alkire 2007; Alkire et al. 2013), but such 
measures view the agent of empowerment in individual rather than collective terms. Simi-
larly, measures of women’s collective efficacy measure their own individual perceived abil-
ity to take collective action (Kuhlmann et al. 2014). Thus, these do not constitute truly col-
lective measures of empowerment; as discussed in our section on collective empowerment, 
we often cannot aggregate individual measures of empowerment to obtain an accurate pic-
ture of collective empowerment.
Measures of community mobilisation (Lippman et  al. 2016), community-level social 
capital (Grootaert 2004; Pronyk et al. 2008; Agampodi et al. 2015), community capability 
or capacity (Paina et al. 2016; Underwood et al. 2013), collective efficacy (Sampson et al. 
2002), sense of community or social cohesion (Kramer et al. 2011; King et al. 2010) could 
potentially be adapted to measure women’s collective empowerment by treating the set of 
women living in a particular locality as a ‘community of interest’ (Laverack 2004). How-
ever, no researchers have done so in a low- and middle-income context to our knowledge.
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10  Discussion
10.1  Defining Women’s Empowerment
In this article, we described a typology for classifying concepts of women’s empowerment 
in terms of fact-, theory- and value-based distinctions implicit in most choices of indica-
tors. We present our typology as a pragmatic tool for researchers and policy-makers6 to 
provide greater clarity on the meaning of empowerment; short, broad definitions based on 
terms such as ‘choice’, ‘opportunity’, ‘agency’ or ‘autonomy’ often turn out just as unclear 
and ambiguous as the original ‘empowerment’ concept.7
For example, a definition of empowerment as ‘the expansion of agency’ (Ibrahim and 
Alkire 2007) shifts the question of what ‘empowerment’ means to a question about what 
‘agency’ means. A definition of agency as the ‘Ability to identify goals and act upon them’ 
(Richardson 2018) raises questions about what distinguishes ‘empowerment’ from a gen-
eral ability to do anything. A definition of empowerment as ‘the process by which those 
who have been denied the ability to make strategic life choices acquire such an ability’ 
(Kabeer 1999) leaves open how complex processes of ‘bargaining and negotiation, decep-
tion and manipulation, subversion and resistance’ (p. 438) (Kabeer 1999) should be classi-
fied in terms of women’s ability to ‘make strategic life choices’.
As a result, the value-laden nature of choices involved in deciding on one conceptualisa-
tion of empowerment over another has been partially obscured and researchers have tried 
to argue for measures of empowerment that target multiple conceptualisations at once, even 
if these potentially conflict with each other in their assumptions.8 For example, Amartya 
Sen has both argued for notions of agency based on direct and indirect freedom. Sen (1993) 
stated that ‘the levers of control in one’s own hands (no matter whether this enhances the 
actual opportunities of achieving our objectives)’ (p. 522) was an important aspect of indi-
vidual freedom, while Sen (1985) argued that ‘it is often not possible to organise society in 
such a way that people can directly exercise the levers that control all the important aspects 
of their personal lives’ (p. 210). Sen (1985) cited an example where a person chooses a 
medical treatment on behalf of an unconscious friend that aligns with the friend’s values 
and beliefs as an example of agency enhancement—clearly the opposite of having the 
‘lever of control in one’s own hands’.
Thus, we argue that empowerment often cannot be captured by simply averaging a large 
number of contrasting measures, as these measures may implicitly carry contradictory 
fact-, theory- and value-based assumptions within them.
6 Our typology can be used by any researchers aiming to measure women’s empowerment whether they are 
creating new indicators or using existing datasets; whether they are using direct survey questions (Alkire 
et al. 2013), revealed-preference models (Doss 2013), or lab-in-the-field experiments (Almås et al. 2015).
7 This point has also been made in the social capital literature by Almedom (2005) who noted that ‘Brief 
definitions capture little of the meaning with which constructs such as social capital are imbued’ (p. 944).
8 The same point is made regarding social capital by Kritsotakis and Gamarnikow (2004) who note that 
the term ‘social capital’ is problematic, because it ‘is pregnant with constituent elements of meaning which 
sometimes contradict one another’ (p. 44).
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10.2  Applying the Typology in Practice
A natural question is to what extent it is necessary to consider all the distinctions in Table 1 
in every empirical study. Controversies over generalized versus specific constructs have 
been characterized as debates between ‘lumpers’—who seek to aggregate narrow concepts 
into broad concepts—and ‘splitters’—who seek to make fine distinctions by splitting broad 
constructs into their constituent elements (Judge et al. 2002).
In any one study, a longer and more precise definition of women’s empowerment might 
be less ambiguous, yet complete clarity can never be obtained for an unobservable con-
struct. More involved definitions can become a Procrustean bed forcing researchers to 
make needlessly convoluted statements that confuse rather than clarify. Highly specific 
questions about big concepts may produce more precise, but less valid measurement, as the 
questions become over-specific for the concept in question (King et al. 2004).
Some researchers have found that seemingly small adjustments to their conceptualisa-
tion of empowerment have resulted in large changes in estimated outcomes (Peterman et al. 
2015; Richardson 2018). Yet other researchers using economic bargaining theory (Lancas-
ter et al. 2006; Anderson and Eswaran 2009; Basu 2006) or ethnographic research (Man-
delbaum 1993; Bennett 1983; Minturn and Kapoor 1993) have conceptualised intra-house-
hold power as a single parameter that affects many aspects of life at the same time.
Many concepts of empowerment that are incompatible in theory might turn out to be 
empirically correlated. In cultural contexts where young, married women are unable to 
even meet and socialise with other women (Mandelbaum 1993), it is difficult to imagine 
individual freedoms for women to go out in public to be opposed to their collective empow-
erment. A woman leaving a physically and emotionally abusive partner has potentially 
escaped both internal, mental restraints on her life and external, interpersonal restraints at 
the same time. Objective expert-driven and subjective local agendas for social change may 
coincide in a development project. Forward- and backward-looking notions of freedom 
coincide with one another in situations where lack of choice reduces intrinsic motivation.
We suggest a pragmatic approach for choosing indicators depending on study pur-
poses. Policy-makers setting ambitious, global targets for women’s empowerment such as 
the Sustainable Development Goals (UN General Assembly 2015) cannot feasibly collect 
pilot data from every relevant context to assess the degree to which different indicators 
correlate or conflict with one another. Researchers and programme evaluators conducting 
impact evaluations cannot post hoc decide which of their measures of empowerment they 
should use. In such situations, we recommend systematically consulting the arguments 
from Table 1 to decide which are deemed to hold the greatest merit and carry the greatest 
weight. From this reduced list of arguments, they can then choose the indicator that makes 
the most sense for their own context as a primary measure. If this measure is difficult or 
expensive to apply directly to their study setting, then they may choose a proxy measure if 
they have strong a priori reason to believe that this measure is highly correlated with their 
ideal measure. To test the robustness of their results to alternative conceptions of empow-
erment, they can include other indicators as secondary measures. These test sensitivity of 
indicator choice, not only to assumptions about women’s social reality, but also to investi-
gators’ own values.
Researchers analysing existing datasets such as the Demographic and Health Surveys 
or the Women’s Empowerment in Agriculture Index (Alkire et al. 2013) should first deter-
mine if the available indicators reflect their own fact-, theory- and value-based assumptions 
about empowerment. This can be ascertained from the classification of common indicators 
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in our previous section (Table 2). If such is the case, they can simply apply the indicators 
to their research. If such indicators are not available, researchers should reflect on whether 
any of the arguments for their preferred notion of empowerment can be given up, perhaps 
because it is not relevant for the local context or because opposing arguments hold greater 
merit or carry greater weight. If existing indicators can be defended based on the revised 
set of assumptions, they can again go ahead with their dataset. Otherwise researchers 
should try to ascertain whether there are grounds for their ideal indicator being empirically 
related to an existing indicator. If this is the case, they can use the existing indicator as a 
proxy. If not, the researchers will need to collect primary data. Once, they have chosen a 
primary indicator, researchers can choose secondary indicators to assess sensitivity to vari-
ations in their own fact-, theory- and value-based assumptions.
As an example of our suggested approach, we can consider recent evaluations of the 
impact of participatory women’s groups on women’s empowerment in rural Nepal (Gram 
et al. 2018a, b). These have used the Relative Autonomy Index as a primary measure of 
empowerment, while decision-making questions and a ‘Power Ladder’ measure (Lok-
shin and Ravallion 2005) were secondary, sensitivity measures (Gram et  al. 2018a, b). 
Gram et  al. (2018b) were particularly careful to make explicit the different value-based 
assumptions underlying different measures of empowerment: the decision-making measure 
focused on respondent’s objective interests, where the Relative Autonomy Index focused 
on their subjective interests; the Power Ladder question took a forward-looking view of 
freedom, where the Relative Autonomy Index took a backward-looking view. In both stud-
ies, little evidence for impact was observed regardless of the measure of empowerment that 
was used, thereby demonstrating robustness of conclusions to variations in fact-, theory-, 
and value-based assumptions.
10.3  Limitations
A few notions of empowerment have been excluded from our typology. First, some con-
cepts of freedom include barriers that are neither internal nor interpersonal, but impersonal 
or due to wider societal forces. For example, the phrase ‘freedom from hunger’ signals a 
concept where the barriers to freedom could stem from an extended drought, a failed har-
vest, a lack of social protection policies, or a global recession. Studies using very broad 
definitions of empowerment often implicitly include such barriers in their conceptualisa-
tion. Wallerstein’s (1992) definition of ‘powerlessness’ as a ‘lack of control over destiny’ 
or a ‘generalized lack of control’ allowed her to include poverty and unemployment as 
indicators of disempowerment in and of themselves. Certain feminist conceptions of the 
‘power-to’ concept (Allen 1998) which sought to avoid the negative connotations ‘power-
over’ ended up defining ‘power-to’ as a general ability to overcome any barrier and achieve, 
experience or resist any change in any dimension. From a measurement perspective, such 
broad definitions allow almost any indicator of positive change to be a direct measure of 
empowerment; thus, we have not included this sense in our typology.
Second, we limited the scope of our typology to notions of women’s empowerment 
focused on choice, opportunity or capability. Many political philosophers have discussed 
the definition of freedom as the acquisition of legitimacy, status or recognition in the eyes 
of others (Berlin 1959; Morriss 2009; Pettit 1996, 1997). Pettit’s (1996, 1997) republican 
notion of freedom sees individual freedom as a lack of institutional domination and humili-
ation. An individual who lived in situations of effective ability to follow their own desires 
and wishes could still be radically unfree if they were bound by illegitimate institutions. 
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For example, a Black slave living in 18th century America who happened to have a well-
meaning master who abstained from using physical punishment and attended to his needs 
would still be unfree given his master’s institutionally protected right to whip and kill him if 
he so pleased. We excluded legitimacy-based notions of empowerment from our typology, 
since their systematic treatment would necessitate analyses of complex social structures of 
recognition and status that lie outside the scope of this paper. We intend our typology to 
be used for studying the role of women’s empowerment in international development, not 
for evaluating the legitimacy of a whole social order. We have similarly avoided discussing 
relationships between communities and institutions.
Finally, we should emphasise that our typology drew primarily from political and fem-
inist philosophy. A large body of philosophical discussion on the conceptualisation and 
measurement of empowerment has taken place in other fields such as community devel-
opment (Billings 2000), community psychology (Saegert and Winkel 1996), critical psy-
chology (Cattaneo and Chapman 2010), and liberation psychology (Prilleltensky 2008). A 
review of major conceptual issues raised by researchers within such disciplines was outside 
the scope of this paper, although it might be an avenue of future research.
11  Conclusion
In this article, we reviewed major debates over the nature of freedom and power from 
feminist and political philosophy and applied their arguments to critiquing existing meas-
ures of empowerment. By examining the arguments for and against contrasting notions 
of empowerment, we demonstrated the difficulties of attempting to capture the construct 
through averaging a large number of contrasting measures. We put forward our typology 
as a pragmatic basis for future development researchers and practitioners to select primary 
and secondary measures of empowerment that conform with the particular fact-, theory- 
and value-based assumptions, investigators feel are justified in their own contexts.
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